As the Biden administration prepares to cede power, it will leave without achieving a highly controversial diplomatic goal: the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, accompanied by a formal security guarantee from the United States to Riyadh. The deal has yet to come to fruition, although rumors of a formal defense pact have circulated in early 2024. Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed these discussions in congressional testimony.

The future of a formal security agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia remains uncertain, even as the Biden administration now seems to continue a pact which would not involve a broader agreement with Israel making concessions in favor of a Palestinian state. Although the administration wants to fast-track the deal so that it is finalized before January 20, it would be unwise to commit more U.S. troops to a country that shares little in common with the United States in terms of interests. and values.

Warmongering organizations and analysts having proposed that closer and enhanced defense cooperation with Riyadh “will reduce the need for direct U.S. intervention.” Experts tout a formal U.S.-Saudi defense pact as a possible deterrent against Iran, as well as an opportunity for America to force Saudi Arabia to cut ties with Beijing, preventing Riyadh from drifting into the Chinese sphere of influence.

However, a formal security agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia risks upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East and increasing Iran’s perception of America as a threat.

Like Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities recently supportedpartnering with destabilizing actors such as Saudi Arabia will further entangle the United States in the Middle East. The United States already helped create moral hazard by arming the Saudi-UAE coalition during its first campaign in 2015. Operation Decisive Storm aerial bombardment campaign on Yemen, thereby becoming complicit in the deaths of thousands of civilians.

These commitments have intensified the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, as around three-quarters of its population lives in poverty. Rather than giving Washington an opportunity to withdraw from the region, strengthening security cooperation with Riyadh would encourage the Saudi regime to continue regional destabilization.

Washington paid the price for enabling Saudi recklessness. After Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries intervened in Yemen’s civil war after rebels seized the capital Sanaa in 2015, the Yemeni Houthis were able to present themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause. The Houthis have since seriously disturbed global trade, carrying out 130 attacks in the Red Sea between the start of the Gaza war and September 20, 2024. But even if Saudi Arabia’s commercial interests are most affected by the disturbances in the Red Sea than those in the United States, the United States is doing the heavy lifting in get involved militarily in strikes against the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia faces no threat to its sovereignty because the Middle East lacks true regional hegemony. Regional stability is one of Washington’s main motivations in its relations with Riyadh. However, Saudi Arabia has been involved in almost every conflict zone and geopolitical fault line in the Middle East. Additionally, the weapons that were given to the Saudis have a history of end up in the hands of opponentsnotably Al-Qaeda and Iran. Additionally, corruption and lack of transparency in Saudi defense institutions is a recurring problem.

In addition to the mismanagement of military aid, devoting equipment that Saudi Arabia would need to strengthen its defense would harm American interests in higher priority theaters, namely the Indo-Pacific. With the ongoing war in Ukraine and potential conflict with China over Taiwan, the US military-industrial base, which is already facing constraintswould experience additional tensions. Although the extent of the pressure is not disclosed, Washington’s inventory of missiles, both offensive and defensive, decreases. Avoiding confrontation with China through deterrence provide asymmetric weapons in Taiwan, such as mobile air defense systems, should be the top priority.

Fears that China will replace the United States as the guarantor of security in the Middle East are unfounded. China has little or no ability to project power in the Middle East and is strongly opposed to military intervention, alliances and the establishment of bases, since American misadventures in the region serve as a warning. Beijing is more than happy to see America bogged down in what it sees as a quagmire. China’s transactional approach in the region poses no threat to Washington’s limited real interests in the Middle East.

Washington must be wary of tightening alliances in a region that should be its least priority. Previous interventions in the Middle East should guide the United States in its cost-benefit analysis of Saudi Arabia’s security. A sober assessment of the U.S.-Saudi alliance would reveal that its costs to American interests, values, and priorities far outweigh its strategic benefits.

Alex Little holds a master’s degree from Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs. He is also a contributor to Young Voices.

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